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ABSTRACT
A quantum random number generator (QRNG) is one which re-
lies on a physical process, extracting randomness from the inherent
uncertainty in quantum mechanics. This is to be contrasted with
current pseudo-random number generators (PRNG), which although
useful, are in fact deterministic: they always yield the same output
sequence given the same input seed. This is unacceptable for some
applications, such as quantum cryptography, which promise uncon-
ditional security. Unfortunately, the rate of QRNGs is still too slow
for practical commercial quantum key distribution systems (which
presently run at speeds over 1 GHz).
Previous QRNGs have been implemented, with the most common
relying on the behavior of a photon at a beam-splitter, producing
a random bit dependent on which of the two paths in which the
photon is detected. However, these are totally limited by detector
saturation rates, typically in the low MHz range. We previously
proposed that by instead using the time interval between detections,
much more random information could be extracted per detection
event. Specifically, instead of only one bit per detection, in principle
one could extract as many bits as the measurement time resolution
would allow.
Over the past two years, we have been exploring this approach
and have constructed a functional QRNG operating at rates up to
130 Mbit/s. The random output has been tested and has passed all
common cryptographic random number tests.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The need for randomness arises frequently in a broad spectrum of
applications, ranging from numerical simulations and statistical
analysis to encryption. Methods for achieving this randomness
have advanced as the applications increase, evolving from simple
mathematical techniques that generate pseudo-random numbers to
physical sources of true random numbers. Dependent on the
constraints of the application involved, it is often sufficient to use
numbers that are not actually random, but random enough. These
can be realized, e.g., by a pseudo-random number generator which
performs mathematical operations on data based on a seed,
typically a very large number. Unfortunately, such schemes are
deterministic: the same initial seed will always create the same
sequence of pseudo-random numbers. As computing power
increases, this is no longer sufficient for many cryptographic
applications, as it is possible for these algorithms to be
compromised. In particular, one of the promises of the recent area
of quantum cryptography is unconditional security based on laws
of physics [1]. For such applications it is critical to have true
sources of randomness.
A quantum random number generator (QRNG) exploits the
inherent randomness present in quantum processes to create
random numbers. Common implementations are based on the
interaction of photons with a beam-splitter [2, 3, 4], where a
random bit is determined by which path a photon takes. More
recently, it was realized that one can use the time between
successive photons in a single path to generate randomness
[5, 6, 7]. We have used this method to achieve random number
generation rates in excess of 100 MHz.
In the following thesis we start by exploring different types of
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random number generators. Our current QRNG implementation is
then described and evaluated. Further quantization of the amount
of available entropy is introduced, and techniques to maximize
that entropy are discussed. Possible detrimental issues, such as
photon-number squeezed light, are introduced, and our methods
for eliminating or compensating for them are presented. Finally,
several future improvements and modifications are brought forth
and evaluated.
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CHAPTER 2
RANDOM NUMBER
GENERATORS
A random number generator (RNG) is any device that is designed
to generate data that appear to have no pattern. Having existed
for centuries, RNGs have steadily evolved from simple mechanisms
such as the flipping of a coin or the shuﬄing of cards into much
more complex computational and physical methods. The driving
force behind this evolution has primarily been the parallel
development of methods to compromise the security afforded by an
RNG. Given that RNGs are typically used for security purposes,
when they are broken, the consequences can be very costly. The
purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to several
different types of random number generators, outline the
characteristics of each, and provide enough background so that the
research presented can be easily and thoroughly understood.
2.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generators
With the advent of modern computing came a revolution in the
way random numbers were generated. Instead of using an
unpredictable physical process, RNGs began to harness the newly
available computational power and shifted into highly complex
mathematical algorithms. These algorithms can produce very long
strings of data that appear to be random but are in fact
completely deterministic and chosen by some initial state, or
“seed.” Because their output is not truly random, these are
referred to as pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). Two
of the most commonly used PRNGs today are variations of linear
feedback shift registers (LFSRs) or linear congruential generators
(LCGs). As illustrated in Figure 2.1, an LFSR is simply a register
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whose input is a linear function of its input state. Because the
exclusive-or and its inverse are the only linear logical operations on
single bits, an LFSR is a shift register whose output is some
combination of the xor of its register value. An LCG, on the other
hand, is a PRNG adhering to the recurrence relation shown in
Equation (2.1):
Xn+1 = (aXn + c) (mod m) (2.1)
In this model Xn is the sequence of random values, m is the
modulus, a is the multiplier, c is the increment, and X0 is the seed
[8]. Additional constraints are placed on the choices of these
parameters, such as the requirement that c and m be relatively
prime. This is one of the reasons for the large effort being put into
finding very large prime numbers.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: Examples of LFSR implementations with a seed state size of n = 2
bits. Bits in (a) have been generated using a seed state of “00,” resulting in
completely periodic results while bits in (b) have been generated using a seed
state of “01,” resulting in the maximum period of 2n − 1.
Although these models are straightforward and easy to
implement, they come with disadvantages. Most importantly,
every type of PRNG is inherently periodic. Given a seed state of n
bits, then the maximum period of any given PRNG cannot exceed
2n. As illustrated in Figure 2.1(a), if a bad seed is chosen, the
period of the output can be very short. LCGs suffer from this
problem more than other PRNGs, as their lower bits typically have
exceptionally short periods. Because of this periodicity, PRNGs
cannot pass many of the statistical suites in use today. Any
exception is referred to as a cryptographically secure
pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) and must undergo
rigorous testing before being accepted by the cryptographic
community.
As mentioned above, the output of a PRNG only appears to be
random. Given the same initial seed, every successive run will
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produce exactly the same result. Although this fact is seemingly
catastrophic from a security standpoint, this is not the case.
Although the seed mechanism makes the PRNG completely
deterministic, as long as the seed is kept “secret,” then the
computational power needed to break most PRNGs is sufficient.
Despite the periodic nature, PRNGs with seeds in excess of 128
bits are commonly used (as searching through 2128 possibilities in a
reasonable amount of time is computationally infeasible), and they
are currently the most widely used and commercially viable option.
2.2 Physical Random Number Generators
Physical random number generators (PhRNGs) rely on complex
physical processes to generate randomness. It is commonly
believed that PhRNGs are true random number generators, as the
processes that drive them are thought to be unpredictable. Unlike
their PRNG counterparts, which are designed to produce virtually
no bias (equal amount of 0s and 1s), PhRNGs occasionally do not
possess this quality. Instead they generate a certain amount of
entropy, which is then compensated for at a later time. In
information theory, this is referred to as Shannon entropy [9], and
the amount associated with a given distribution of N events is
given by S = −∑Ni=0 Pi log2 Pi, where Pi is an individual
probability, corresponding to an outcome i, in the probability mass
function of P . This entropy is measured in bits, so an entropy of 1
random bit per output bit is ideal. To reduce any inherent bias,
compensation techniques such as hash functions are used; however,
these are in effect pseudo-random number generators themselves.
Physical random number generators come in many forms,
ranging from the simple (such as roulette wheels and lottery balls)
to the more complex, such as atmospheric noise. A quantum
random number generator, the focus of the research presented here
and the subject of the next section, is a type of PhRNG as well.
However, instead of relying on a complex physical process, a
QRNG relies on the uncertainty present in relatively simple
quantum processes to generate randomness.
5
2.3 Quantum Random Number Generators
As stated above, a QRNG exploits the inherent randomness
present in quantum processes to create random numbers. Several
QRNGs based on the quantum properties of light have been
proposed and implemented. Most previous systems [2, 3, 10, 11],
such as the one depicted in Figure 2.2 rely on the behavior of an
incoming photon at a beam-splitter to generate data.
Figure 2.2: Example of a common QRNG implementation. Photons are
directed along one of two paths by a beam-splitter and are registered by the
corresponding detector.
Dependent on which detector registers the incoming photon, a 0
or 1 is generated. This approach has the significant drawback that
each photon can create at most only one bit of data, and in
practice much less, since it is only detected events that contribute.
Thus, the scheme is limited by the detection speed: one can
generate random bits only at rates substantially below the detector
saturation limit. Implementations with multiple detectors, while
somewhat mitigating this problem, can suffer from bias created by
differing detection efficiencies. Recently it was shown [7] that such
bias could be eliminated by using a single detector, and comparing
the time intervals between three successive detection events.
However, this method is limited to a maximum of one-half bit of
randomness per detection, so it is even more constrained by
detector saturation.
Our implementation [6] also uses only a single detector to
generate the data, but it uses the photon arrival time itself as the
quantum random variable, as shown in Figure 2.3.
As originally proposed [5, 6], the time between successive
photons is divided into time-bins, which are created by a high
resolution counter operating in parallel with the detector (in
principle this could also be combined with a beam-splitter and two
6
Figure 2.3: Example of our QRNG implementation. Time intervals between
successive registered photons are translated into time-bin values. Because the
average number of time-bins between detections can be quite large, one can
distill multiple random bits per detection event.
detectors to obtain an extra random bit per detection). A given
detection time interval can therefore provide multiple random bits
per detection event. If we had a constant waiting time distribution,
for which every time-bin had the same probability of occurring,
then given n bins, we would generate a perfect log2(n) random bits
per detection event. However, the stimulated emission of photons
from a semiconductor device is believed to be a process in which
events occur continuously and independent of each other, i.e., a
Poissionan process. The number of events that have occurred up
to time t is given as N(t), and the number of events in the time
interval [t, t+ τ ] is characterized by
P [N(t+ τ )−N(t) = k] = e−λt(λt)k/k!, where λ is the average
number of events per unit time. Consequently, the time between
arrivals is the same as the time until the first arrival (since they
are all independent) and is therefore given by
P [N(t)−N(0) = 0] = e−λt(λt)0/0! = e−λt.
As shown in Figure 2.4, the waiting-time distribution is a
decaying exponential, with average value λ. As such, the entropy
associated with each detection will be less than that if the
distribution were simply uniform. In order to compensate for this
lack of randomness, a data hashing technique must be used to
“whiten” the random number string, thereby preparing a shorter
but more random string, with randomness approaching one
random bit per bit.
A hash function is simply a mathematical technique that
converts a large amount of input data into a smaller fixed-length
string. A cryptographic hash function, such as SHA [12], has more
stringent constraints suited for tailoring its output to meet the
demands required for secure communication. Among these, and of
7
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Figure 2.4: Actual (jagged trace) vs. theoretical (smooth curve) waiting-time
distribution of raw data given an average detection rate of 6 MHz and a
time-bin resolution of 5 ns. Here we have chosen the first time-bin to be after
the 45-ns dead-time of the detector. Deviation from the expected decaying
exponential is due to Poissonian noise and timing effects within the system.
additional importance when applied to an RNG, is the requirement
that all possible outputs occur with the same probability. An
example of whitened data from our QRNG is shown in Figure 2.5.
This data has passed rigorous statistical tests, including the NIST
test suite [13] and the DIEHARD statistical tests [14].
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Figure 2.5: Final whitened data output from our QRNG.
Unfortunately, as is the case with all hash functions, sometimes
collisions occur: cases where different inputs map to the same
output. Because of this possibility we need to supply some extra
entropy into the input buffer to make sure each hashed output has
approximately the same probability. Further quantization of the
amount of excess entropy needed is explored in Chapter 3.
2.4 Implementation Details
The implementation detailed here has four major components:
photon production, optical attenuation, photon detection, and
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data processing and storage. Although our initial experiments used
an LED light source, we now employ an attenuated laser diode, for
two primary reasons. First, the light emitted from a typical LED is
in principle in a thermal state (i.e., with photon bunching over a
small interval), whereas laser emission is ideally in a coherent
state; this advantage is somewhat spurious, however, as the
amount of bunching in an LED is minuscule, and in any event, our
dead-time deletion (the time after a detection during which the
detection device is disabled) automatically rejects such closely
spaced photons. Second, it has been shown that a simple
current-limited LED circuit can, under certain conditions, actually
produce photon-number squeezed light [15]. The resulting
sub-Poissonian waiting-time distribution would display lower
random fluctuations than that of a laser diode. As discussed
below, the random deletion afforded by our strong attenuation
should completely eliminate any such squeezing correlations.
Nevertheless, to avoid all such concerns, we deemed it preferable to
use the system with the simplest characteristics (the laser diode).
We have used a variety of techniques to attenuate the light to
the desired photon flux. If we imagine that the photons are
emitted in a perfect coherent state, governed by Poisson statistics,
then in principle any random deletion process will not alter the
statistics. In fact, even if the photons are produced, e.g., in a
squeezed state [15], the correlations will be washed out by the
large amount of attenuation required [16] — we typically operate
with over 120 dB of optical attenuation, so that a given photon
from the light source has less than a 10−6 chance of making it to
the detector. Given this level of attenuation, numerical simulations
show no noticeable difference in the amount of entropy per
detection between a coherent state and a heavily attenuated
initially perfect number-squeezed state.
Since we rely on the independence of the photon arrival times, it
is important that the physical process used to control the flux not
introduce unwanted (or unknown) correlations. For example,
periodically gating the laser diode so that it is operating only for a
short time would not be appropriate, even though the average flux
might be as desired; in that case the entropy would be greatly
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reduced. We have implemented the necessary attenuation using
three methods: spatial-mode selection (only collecting a small
fraction of the emitted light), standard reflection neutral density
filters, and a series of crossed polarizers. As predicted, in all cases
we observed no significant difference in the final photon statistics,
i.e., the waiting-time distribution was unaffected. Note that in the
case of polarization filtering, we are essentially relying on the same
intrinsic quantum mechanical randomness that is assumed for
many quantum cryptography implementations [1]; the security of
the latter depends on the fact that a photon’s transmission
through a polarization analyzer is a truly random quantum event.
Similarly, the reflective neutral density filters are an extreme limit
of a simple beam-splitter.
The transmitted photons are detected by a single-photon
counter, in our case an avalanche photodiode (APD; id Quantique
100-MMF50-ULN). Although this device’s 45-ns dead-time implies
a saturation rate of over 22 MHz, in practice the device can only
sustain a continuous count rate of 11 MHz, resulting in random
number generation rates up to 130 MHz. We have also run
successfully using a Perkin-Elmer APD (SPCM-AQR-13). In this
case, however, we were further limited to rates of 5 MHz (to avoid
damaging the detector); after all processing the SPCM-based
system reached random number generation rates up to 20.1 MHz.
The detector pulse is read by an ACAM TDC-GPX
Time-to-Digital-Converter [17]. This relatively inexpensive ($300)
device is able to resolve detections with up to 27-ps accuracy. The
APD pulses are directed toward the “stop” channel, while the start
is periodically reset with a 100 kHz pulse to reduce any drift
effects within the device. The time interval data is read by a field
programmable gate array (Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGA) and input into
a register. The number of bits assigned to each detection is
dependent on our expected entropy per detection, and
consequently on the average detection rate (e.g., it would not be
appropriate to assign 8 bits to each interval if the average rate
corresponds to only 6 bits of entropy per detection). The data
string for each detection event is truncated to this calculated
length, and concatenated in a register until enough data is present
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to input into the hash function.
Finally, the hashed data is output through the PCI port on the
FPGA and stored on a desktop PC, where further manipulation
and testing can occur. Figure 2.6 below shows the data flow of our
implementation.
Figure 2.6: Data flow diagram for our implementation. Photons emitted from
the laser diode cause the APD to output pulses which are registered by the
counter. For each new detection, depending on the time elapsed between
subsequent detection events (as determined by the TDC-GPX), the counter
produces a random string. These counts are then accumulated until enough
random data is present to “whiten” using the SHA-256 hash function. The
final data is then output through the PCI bus.
The QRNG presented here has achieved a final output rate of
130 MHz. Additional methods of increasing this rate will be
discussed in Chapter 5. This rate is well above that of currently
commercially available QRNGs, which have random number
generation rates of 4 MHz per detector [18].
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CHAPTER 3
ENTROPY
As discussed in the previous chapter, the processes that drive a
PhRNG may be random, but not necessarily ideal. Instead of every
possible output value having an equal probability of occurring, an
inherent amount of bias may be present. In the case of the QRNG
detailed in this thesis, the output probabilities take the form of a
decaying exponential (instead of the ideal flat distribution). When
this is the case, it becomes increasingly important to properly
quantify the amount of randomness that is generated. In
information theory this is also analogous to the amount of
information contained in a message, and is referred to as entropy.
When used in this context, the term entropy typically refers to
Shannon entropy [9] and will be referred to as such for the
remainder of this thesis. There are, however, related measures of
entropy that are of special interest in RNGs. In particular, the
min-entropy [19] is a measure of the largest amount of information
an attacker could gain from a single guess; it is often used in
evaluating randomness in cryptographic systems. In this chapter,
we will explore both types of entropy, as well as ways of
maximizing the amount output in relation to our QRNG
implementation.
3.1 Shannon Entropy
As discussed in Section 2.2, the Shannon entropy of a message
with N possible outcomes is given by the equation
S = −∑Ni=0 Pi log2(Pi), where Pi is the probability of the ith
outcome. For random number generation, an ideal distribution, as
shown in Figure 3.1(a), would have equal probability for each
12
outcome, giving its Shannon entropy the maximum value of exactly
log2(N) bits. Our QRNG, however, has an output waiting-time
distribution of the form e−λt, where λ is the mean value and t is
the time until the next photon is detected (t = 0 corresponds to
the detection of the previous photon), as shown in Figure 3.1(b).
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Figure 3.1: Probability mass functions for (a) uniform and (b) Poissonian
waiting-time distributions.
For our implementation, a possible outcome X corresponds to a
time-interval measurement between two successive photon
detections. The amount of entropy that can then be extracted
depends primarily on the rate of incoming detections and the time
resolution with which they can be measured. By increasing the
resolution, more possible values can “fit” into the decaying
exponential probability distribution, and thus the amount of
available entropy is increased. Since the available entropy increases
as more time-bins become resolvable, a reasonable approximation
is that the average amount of entropy per detection increases by
one bit every time N increases by a factor of two, as shown in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Example average entropy per detection for a rate of 11 MHz.
Time Resolution (ns) Average Entropy (bits)
50 2.05
25 3.05
10 4.45
5 5.51
0.1 11.26
0.05 12.27
In the limit that infinitely small time resolution can be obtained,
an infinite amount of bits can be extracted from any detection. It
is important to mention, however, that having a resolution less
than jitter of the equipment could introduce unwanted bias. This
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argument is somewhat spurious, however, as the random deletion
afforded by our detector’s dead-time (time after a detection during
which the detector will not register incoming photons) eliminates
this effect from the final data.
3.2 Detection Speed vs. Shannon Entropy
While increasing the resolution results in a logarithmic increase in
the rate of entropy generation, increasing the source rate has a
somewhat different effect. In actuality, although increasing the
rate results in more detections per second, it also lowers the
available entropy per detection, as the average time-bin value gets
lower. As shown in Figure 3.2, increasing the detection rate causes
the waiting-time distribution to “shrink;’ and become more
predictable. In the limiting case, all detections fall into the first
time-bin and no entropy is generated.
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical Poissonian waiting-time distributions for our QRNG
implementation. Average detection rates of (a) 5 MHz, (b) 10 MHz, (c) 20
MHz, and (d) 50 MHz result in curves of decreasing entropy.
To calculate the maximum amount of entropy generated per
second, we must first calculate the available entropy per detection.
For an average incoming photon rate R and time-bin size ∆t, the
probability of a photon falling into time-bin i is given by the
equation Pi = R∆te
−R∆ti. The total entropy per detection is then
calculated by summing over all available Pi according to the
Shannon entropy equation S = −∑Ni=0 Pi log2(Pi). Given an APD
with dead-time DT, the “click-rate” (or rate at which photons are
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registered) is given by CR = 1/(DT + 1/R). Therefore, given an
entropy value per click and a rate at which they are registered, we
can multiply the two together to get the available entropy per
second. Assuming that our time-bin resolution is fixed,1 we can
then calculate the entropy per second for varying detection speeds.
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Figure 3.3: Entropy per second vs. detection speed given a 45-ns dead-time
and (a) 5-ns and (b) 27-ps time-bin resolutions. Note the different vertical
scales on the two plots.
As shown in Figure 3.3, the maximum detection rates vary
slightly with differing time-bin resolutions, with the peak
approaching 1/DT as resolution increases. For very high rates,
however, it is prudent to operate slightly below the maximum
detection speed, as slight fluctuations can quickly saturate the
detector, giving zero entropy per detection. Specifically, if the
incoming detections occur immediately after every dead-time
period, then all detections will fall into the first time-bin. The
onset of saturation occurs when the detection rate approaches
1/DT.
Verifying the above curves was experimentally infeasible as the
optimum operating speed was well above the maximum safe
continuous count rate of our detector (11 Mc/s). However, by
artificially increasing the dead-time by gating off the APD after a
successful detection, we can lower the optimal detection speed,
allowing for a direct comparison and verification of our theory, as
shown in Figure 3.4.
1We have also considered variable bin widths and alternate bin ordering to reduce the
amount of bias in the waiting-time distribution.
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Figure 3.4: Theoretical (curve) and actual (points) entropy per second vs.
detection speed, given a 50-ns (a) and 3-µs (b) dead-time.
3.3 Min-Entropy
Of special interest in RNGs, particularly in security applications, is
a measure known as min-entropy. A special case of Re´nyi entropy
[19], it is given by the equation Smin = − log (max{Pi}), where
max(Pi) is the probability of the most likely event. For example, in
our Poissonian waiting-time distribution, the most likely time-bin
value is always the first. In some sense, the min-entropy is a
measure of the “worst-case scenario,” or the maximum amount of
information that can be gained from a single attack. Therefore, in
applications where privacy is important, the min-entropy can be
considered of more importance than the Shannon entropy. In the
optimal case, however, the min-entropy equals the Shannon
entropy, as all N possible time-bin values would have the same
probability 1/N ; in this case S = log2(N).
As mentioned in Section 2.3, our random data is extracted from
the waiting-time distribution of a Poissonian process, characterized
by a rate parameter λ. Previously, we have assumed a
homogeneous Poissonian process, one for which λ is constant and
time-independent. Since our light source is a
constant-current-driven laser diode operating well above threshold,
this is a reasonable assumption, as the photon flux is directly
proportional to the input current. It has been shown [5, 6],
however, that by shaping the photon flux, the counting statistics
can be altered, and the waiting-time distribution can be tailored to
approximate the ideal, uniform case.
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To determine how we need to modify the rate parameter we
must consider an inhomogeneous Poissonian process. In this case,
our rate is dependent on time, and the expected number of events
between time a and b is λa,b =
∫ b
a λ(t)dt. Consequently, the
waiting-time distribution is now given by λ(t)e−
∫ b
a
λ(t′)dt′[20].
Given a waiting-time distribution with T possible time-bins, the
ideal case is one for which the probability of every bin is
time-independent, and exactly 1/T . Therefore, λ(t) must be a
solution to the equation
λ(t)e−
∫ t
0
λ(t′)dt′ =
1
T
. (3.1)
A rate parameter of the form λ(t) = 1/(T − t) is a solution to
this equation.2
Since λ(t) represents the photon arrival probability, it is
dependent on the photon flux of the laser diode, which in turn has
a linear relationship with the input current. Therefore, if the
current is equal to I(t) = 1/(T − t), then the photon flux should
be proportionally altered, achieving the ideal case.
As shown in Figure 3.5(a), this exact shape is impossible to
produce, as the current grows rapidly, thus requiring a very high
bandwidth and dynamic range and possibly damaging the diode.
Approximating the shape, however, yields reasonable results, with
a simulated min-entropy of approximately 0.96 random bits per
bit. Additional details on circuit realization of this pulse shape can
be found in Appendix B.
The choice of the reset period T depends on several factors. The
entropy per detection increases on a logarithmic scale (i.e., to go
from 6 to 7 bits requires 64 extra bins, while increasing from 7 to 8
requires 128), so an optimal reset period may not necessarily be the
longest one. As seen in Figure 3.6, the optimal period is strongly
dependent on the detector dead-time. If we had detectors with no
dead-time, for example, the optimal reset period would be after 2
bins (or 4 bins, as the interval between 1 and 2 bits is the same).
Unfortunately, however, the peak generation rate corresponds to a
2
−
∫ t
0
λ(t′)dt′ = −
∫ t
0
1
T−t′
dt′ = ln(T − t)− ln(T ) = ln((T − t)/T )
. λ(t)e
−
∫
t
0
λ(t)dt
= 1
T−t
eln((T−t)/T ) = 1
T
.
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Figure 3.5: Ideal (dashed) and simulated (solid) shaped pulse of 1/(T − t) (a)
pulse-shape; (b) associated waiting-time distribution.
detection rate well above what our current APDs can sustain.
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Figure 3.6: Peak min-entropy generation rate vs. trigger period T for 45-ns
(short dash), 30-ns (long dash) and 10-ns (solid) dead-times. Optimal
generation rates (as denoted by arrows) decrease with dead-time.
3.4 Min-Entropy vs. Shannon Entropy
Although min-entropy is arguably more critical for random
number generation, earlier stages of our experiment were
quantified according to Shannon entropy. Therefore, here we
compare the two measures and their respective rates.
For the Shannon entropy “version,” the input current is kept
constant, and the detections typically come faster than in the
shaped-current implementation (because of the higher probability
of earlier time-bins). For the min-entropy version, however, this is
not the case, as every time-bin is equally likely. Also, if no
detection occurs before the reset period, then the counter is reset,
and that time interval is wasted. For these reasons, the rate at
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which Shannon entropy is generated is slightly higher than the
min-entropy rate, as shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Shannon entropy (dashed) and min-entropy (solid) generation rates
versus detection rate, given 27-ps resolution and 45-ns detector dead-time.
It is important to note, however, that although slower, the
min-entropy version has several advantages. The amount of
entropy input into the hash function is fixed at 266 bits (as
explained in Chapter 4). Therefore, if each detection event
contains more entropy, it will take fewer detections to reach the
required amount. Since the hash is arguably the most
computationally expensive component of our design, using the
min-entropy allows for more FPGA resources to be used elsewhere.
Additionally, from a security standpoint, the min-entropy version is
more secure, as it relies less on a potentially insecure hash function.
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CHAPTER 4
POST-PROCESSING
In order to ensure the quality of our QRNG output, a significant
level of post-processing is required. Typically, when used in this
context, post-processing refers to the process of reducing bias in the
output, but for the purposes of this chapter it will also encompass
testing the data for randomness. As uniformity (no bias of 0s or
1s) is only a single requirement for random numbers, examining
the data with a series of widely accepted tests helps to identify
other possible problems (i.e., absence of correlations and
predictability). Although our current implementation carries out
only a fraction of post-processing in real-time, future
implementations will include the entire process.
4.1 Hashing
Because of the bias present in our waiting-time distribution, a
data-hashing technique must be used to “whiten” the random
number string, thereby preparing a shorter but more random
string, with randomness approaching one random bit per bit
(alternatively, as discussed in Section 3.3, one could use a shaped
optical pulse to approximate a constant waiting-time distribution,
though here too it is likely that some residual hashing would be
needed). The hash function used in our QRNG implementation is
the SHA-256 hash, of the SHA series created by NIST [12]. The
hash takes as input a 512-bit block, some of which is
predetermined and some of which contains the actual message.
The output is a 256-bit hash string, with each of the 2256 possible
strings having approximately the same probability.
A hash function, is by definition, a mathematical procedure that
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converts a large, possibly variably sized, amount of data into a
smaller hash value. Typically, when used in whitening
applications, hash functions must satisfy two criteria: determinism
and uniformity. Determinism is to the property that the same
input always maps to the same output. While harder to prove,
uniformity requires that the outputs be spread across all possible
values with equal probability. Testing this completely would be
computationally infeasible (e.g., 2256 is more than the number of
electrons in the universe), but we have verified uniformity to a
lesser degree by separating the output into smaller 16-bit blocks,
as shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Final whitened data output from our QRNG.
Although 256 bits of data are output from the hash, it is
imperative to realize that this does not necessarily correspond to
256 bits of entropy. A common mistake is to “seed” a hash with a
smaller random bit string and still assume all of the output is
random (if the seed is only 8 bits long, only 28 of the 2256 hash
values will ever occur). Therefore, it is prudent to assume that the
net amount of entropy output will always be less than the net
input. A reasonable assumption, and one by which our QRNG
operates, is that by providing 10 “extra” bits of entropy (i.e., 266
random bits input), the hash function will be sufficiently
saturated. It can be shown [21] that 266 random input bits
corresponds to an output entropy of 255.9999, or a Shannon
entropy per bit of 0.999996. The corresponding output
min-entropy is 255.28 bits, or 0.9972 random bits per bit.
In order to determine the amount of entropy input into the hash,
we must first calculate the expected entropy per detection. For a
measured average time-bin λ, the probability of a photon falling
into time-bin i is given by the equation Pi = λe
−λt. The total
entropy per detection is then calculated by summing over all
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available Pi according to the Shannon entropy equation
S = −∑Pi log2(Pi). Given an average entropy of N bits, then the
hash input buffer is filled with blocks of size 266/N , until the
266-bit requirement is met.1
4.2 Randomness Tests
In order to test the amount of randomness present in our data, we
have performed several tests. Some, while applicable to the
uniform hashed data, are not appropriate for the raw unhashed
data, and vice versa. Although there is no true test to determine
whether a sequence of bits is random (as the simplest example, the
next block of bits could duplicate all the data up to that point),
there are several widely accepted tests that we have utilized.
Several of these tests are designed to test a specific null
hypothesis. In this case, the hypothesis is that the bit-sequence
under test is random. Each of the tests creates a test statistic,
which is then used to calculate an associated p-value, which is
related to the strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis.
This p-value is a value on the interval [0,1], with a p-value of 1
denoting perfect randomness and a p-value of 0 denoting perfect
nonrandomness. A significance level (α) is then chosen for the
tests. If p≥α, then the null hypothesis is accepted; i.e., the
sequence appears to be random. If p < α, then the null hypothesis
is rejected; i.e., the sequence appears to be nonrandom. Typically,
α is chosen to be 0.01 [13], meaning that, assuming the test is
passed, the sequence can be said to be random (or nonrandom)
with a confidence of 99%.
4.2.1 Autocorrelation function
The measured waiting-time data (of Figure 2.4) does not reveal
anything about the order in which the underlying data was
produced; if that is not random, then obviously the random
number output would not be, either. To detect any simple
1In the case of an average entropy of a fraction of a bit, the value is rounded down.
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frequency patterns we have performed an autocorrelation analysis
on the raw prehash data. The autocorrelation function is used in
signal processing and statistics to measure how well a signal
matches a shifted version of itself. The autocorrelation of a
“white-noise” signal — a signal with no frequency patterns —
would look like a flat line except for a single sharp peak in the
center. Our raw data exhibited this behavior, as shown in Figure
4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Autocorrelation function results from prehash data for a
correlation distance of 500. Inset displays the solitary peak in the middle, an
indication of random white-noise behavior.
Autocorrelation analysis was also performed on the hashed data,
but is not directly relevant as frequency patterns would carry over
through the hash.
4.2.2 χ2 analysis
To test how well the data fits the expected distribution (both for
raw and hashed data), a series of χ2 tests were performed. For the
raw data, the distribution was compared against a decaying
exponential, while the hashed data was compared to the uniform
distribution. Although testing the output of a widely accepted
hash seemed somewhat unnecessary, it has proven useful in testing
for various logical problems.2
The χ2 statistic is calculated using the formula
2For example, a previous implementation had an error by which the last value in the buffer
register was output twice. The χ2 test was able to detect this, and subsequent autocorrelation
analysis was able to pinpoint the cause.
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χ2 = (Oi −Ei)2/Ei, where Oi and Ei respectively are the observed
and expected values of each outcome i. The resulting χ2 statistic is
then compared against a χ2 function with the same degrees of
freedom. For binned data, the number of degrees of freedom is
equal to the number of bins [8]. Comparing the two values gives an
associated p-value, that represents the probability that any
deviation from the expected case was due to random fluctuations
only. A generally accepted threshold for RNGs is a significance
level of 0.01, which means that there is a 99% chance that
observed deviations are due to chance alone.
For the whitened data, the average p-value across 100 trials was
0.505, with the lowest being 0.091 and the highest being 0.982.
Therefore, our final QRNG data passed the χ2 test with a 0.01
significance level. The raw counter data, however, failed, even
when compared against a decaying exponential, which we
attributed to after-pulsing.
After-pulsing, in the context of APDs, refers to the “false”
detections caused by trapped carriers left over from the initial
avalanche. For our detector, the peak after-pulse time is
approximately 0.1µs after a “correct” detection, with a total
probability of 3%. To verify that the deviation in the χ2 test was,
in fact, from this effect, additional analysis was performed. First,
since the contribution to the waiting-time distribution due to
after-pulsing should also be a decaying exponential (just shifted by
0.1 µs and at 3% of the original value), we superimposed the two
together and did a χ2 test again, for which the test passed with a
significance level of 0.01. Therefore, we are fairly confident that at
least most of the deviation is from after-pulsing. In any event, the
nonrandomness from such after-pulsing is removed by the hash.
4.2.3 Overlapping serial test
Another common test for RNGs is the overlapping serial test
(OST), or overlapping m-tuple test [22]. Although it is a variation
of the χ2 test against uniformity, the serial test is important as it
can also test for correlations in the supposedly random data. The
OST groups the random output into a cyclic string of tuples and,
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after repeating the experiment n times, overlaps the outcomes and
examines them for uniformity. For example, if after a particular
time-bin x an electronic characteristic caused the next output to
be time-bin y, then the tuple [x, y] would be overrepresented and
be detected by this test. The OST is also generally considered to
be one of the most flexible and stringent RNG tests available, as
adjusting the tuple size can reveal previously unknown
characteristics.3
The result of the OST is a χ2 value, which given a distribution
with d possible values and tuple size t should have dt − dt−1
degrees of freedom. The p-value should be uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. If the tuples are too evenly distributed, the
p-value will approach zero, while if they are too unevenly
distributed, the p-value will approach 1. Unfortunately, given a
random output string of length N , and t possible outcomes, if
k = log2(N), then the amount of memory required is on the order
of 2kt+1 (e.g., assuming k = 6 and t = 6, we would need 36 GB of
memory). Because of this constraint, we have performed this test
for various combinations of k and t only up to a value of kt = 24.
Each tuple:output combination was tested 32 times, and each
resulting p-value distribution was tested for uniformity using the
Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test [24]. The QRNG is rejected
if the p-value significance level is less than 0.01, meaning the
distribution has a 1% chance of not being from the uniform
distribution. For the tests where kt = 24, we tested the versions of
[k = 1, t = 24], [k = 2, t = 12], [k = 3, t = 8], [k = 4, t = 6], [k =
8, t = 3], [k = 12, t = 2], and [k = 24, t = 1], for which all versions
passed the test. An example p-value distribution for [k = 4, t = 4]
is shown in Table 4.1.
4.2.4 NIST and DIEHARD test suites
There are several test suites available for random number testing,
but for this experiment we have chosen two of the most popular:
the DIEHARD Test Suite [14] and the NIST Statistical Test Suite
3For example, the popularly used GNU Scientific Library contains 57 RNGs, 29 of which
failed the OST for various tuple sizes [23].
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Table 4.1: Example results from OST given tuple size of 4 and 24 possible
values. The resulting χ2 value should fluctuate around 61440.
χ2 p-value
61017 0.8863
61483 0.4504
61443 0.4958
61011 0.8949
61170 0.7791
60968 0.9111
61044 0.8934
61510 0.3108
61524 0.2928
[13]. The DIEHARD suite contains 15 random number tests and
requires approximately 3 million random samples. The majority of
tests are run many times, and a resulting p-value is recorded. The
p-value is obtained by P = F (X), where F is the assumed
distribution of the random sample variable X. The p-values should
be uniform on the interval [0, 1] if the input file contains truly
random bits. The p-values are then tested for uniformity using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test [25]. Unfortunately, the
approximation for F (X) is asymptotic (i.e., uniform everywhere
except approaching zero and one), for which the fit is the worst in
the tails, so obtaining an accurate significance level is difficult.4 In
any event, the tests were run on 100 sets of 3-Mbit sets of our final
whitened data, and the resulting p-values were tested for
uniformity, as shown in Table 4.2. The lowest p-value recorded was
0.019 and the highest was 0.98, which is consistent with the
expected results of the suite.
Similarly, NIST has released a statistical suite for
pseudo-random and random number generators for cryptographic
applications. As cryptographic applications require the
highest-quality random numbers, this suite is especially stringent.
As with the above, each test was run 100 times, and resulting
p-values were tested for uniformity. The highest p-value across all
tests was 0.994 and the lowest was 0.016, giving this RNG a
passing value at a significance level of α = 0.01. The results from
this suite are shown in Table 4.3.
4Instructions for the test suite advise that p-values above 0.975 and below 0.025 are not
abnormal; however, p-values of 1 or 0 out to six decimal places indicate the random number
generator has significant issues.
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Table 4.2: Results from DIEHARD Test Suite [14] for final whitened data.
Test Result of DIEHARD Test
Birthday Spacings PASS
Overlapping 5 PASS
Binary Rank Test 31 PASS
Binary Rank Test 32 PASS
Binary Rank Test 6 PASS
Craps Test PASS
RUNS Test PASS
Overlapping Sums PASS
Squeeze PASS
3-D Spheres PASS
Min Distance PASS
Parking Lot PASS
Count the 1-s PASS
OPSO PASS
BitStream PASS
Table 4.3: Results from NIST Test Suite [13] for final whitened data.
Test Result of NIST Test
Frequency PASS
Block Frequency PASS
Cumulative Sum PASS
RUNS PASS
Long RUNS PASS
Rank PASS
DFFT PASS
Non-Overlapping PASS
Overlapping PASS
Universal PASS
Approx Entropy PASS
Serial PASS
Linear Complexity PASS
Random Excursions PASS
Serial PASS
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CHAPTER 5
FUTURE
IMPROVEMENTS
Our QRNG implementation has four major elements: photon flux
production, single-photon detection, time-interval measurement,
and data processing. In this chapter, techniques for increasing
both the quality and rate of random number generation will be
discussed. Some of these methods (such as shaped-pulse-driven
diodes) are specific to this application, while others (such as better
detectors), have a broader range of applications. For each
improvement, a qualitative discussion on how random number
generation will be affected is presented.
5.1 Photon Production
As discussed in Section 3.3, we are currently exploring driving our
light source with a shaped pulse of the form 1/(T − t), so as to
reduce the bias present in our Poissonian waiting-time distribution.
While increasing the amount of min-entropy present in our raw
counter data, this improvement will significantly reduce the
amount of required hashing, freeing up additional resources on the
FPGA for real-time analysis. Additional details on the actual
circuit are given in Appendix B.
5.2 Detection Methods
The method by which photons are detected is one of the most
important parameters for our QRNG system. While detection
efficiency is typically an important criterion when evaluating a
single-photon counter, for our application this is not the case.
Instead, we are more interested in the maximum detection rate and
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the detector dead-time. As shown in Figure 3.3(b), our current
rate of detection is not optimal for our time-bin size of 27 ps.
Increasing the detection speed will allow a faster rate of random
number generation, while also allowing for further improvements in
time-bin resolution and dead-time to offer additional benefit.
Therefore, we have researched several detection methods and
evaluated them with respect to their expected performance benefit
to our QRNG system.
5.2.1 Photomultiplier tubes
A photomultiplier tube (PMT) is a high-efficiency photon-counting
device used in many applications such as medical imaging, blood
tests, and high-end imaging applications. A viable alternative to
APDs, PMTs offer extremely low noise and very high efficiency. Of
special interest to us is the fact that a PMT contains no Johnson
noise, only quantum shot noise. This is overshadowed, however, by
the requirement that when used in single-photon counting mode, a
PMT has to be reset, thus limiting its continuous detection speed
to rates well below the 1-GHz speed of the APD. Additionally,
PMTs are extremely sensitive and can be burnt out easily, while
APDs generally contain added circuitry to control the avalanche
current. Therefore, at this time, APDs are a much more viable
option.
5.2.2 Self-differencing APDs
Avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are widely used for single-photon
detection because of their simplicity and robustness. When an
APD is biased above the breakdown voltage, a single photo-excited
carrier can quickly multiply as a result of impact ionization,
producing an easily detectable current. Once triggered, the
avalanche flows through the whole multiplication volume of the
APD; because the avalanche is self-sustaining, it must be quenched
by reducing the bias to a level below the breakdown voltage. This
is typically done by operating the diode in gated Geiger mode, for
which voltage pulses are periodically applied for several
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nanoseconds to bias the APD above the breakdown voltage. While
the pulses are high, the APD is enabled and can detect single
photons; while they are low the APD is disabled, as shown in
Figure 5.1(a). The resulting photon-induced signal is then
compared against the APDs characteristic capacitive response.
Since this capacitive response can also be quite large, this makes it
difficult to detect much smaller avalanches.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: APDs operating in (a) conventional and (b) self-differencing
Geiger modes, as shown in [26].
It has been shown, however, that by incorporating additional
circuitry, it is possible to eliminate the capacitive response from
the output signal, thus revealing much weaker signals and even
enabling photon-number resolution [26]. As shown in Figure
5.1(b), the output signal is split into two paths, one of which
introduces a delay of one period of an alternating bias voltage
relative to the other path. The two signals are then subtracted
from each other using a differencer circuit, allowing for the
discrimination of avalanche currents more than 10 times weaker
than what can be detected conventionally. Additionally, this
method requires a much smaller applied voltage, allowing the
detector to be operated at rates exceeding 1 GHz, after which
after-pulsing becomes problematic.
Assuming only a maximum detection rate of 1 GHz (and not
photon number resolution), this improvement alone would allow for
our QRNG to operate at speeds exceeding 5 Gbit/s. If, however,
photon number resolution were possible, other alternatives (such
as using photon number as the quantum random variable) become
available. Recently, these detectors were used in conjunction with
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the beam-splitter approach, as shown in Figure 2.2, but because of
resolution issues they were able to achieve only 4 Mbit/s [27].
5.2.3 APD arrays
Instead of a single APD per photon-counting module, currently
available [28], multi-pixel photon counter arrays (MPPCs) can be
used. Each array consists of multiple APD pixels operating in
Geiger mode, with each pixel outputting a pulse signal when it
detects a single photon. The total output from the MPPC is the
sum of all the signals. While the largest device available has 1600
pixels, it currently affords no additional QRNG performance
benefit over the single photon-number-resolving APD. If, however,
it were possible to tell which pixel fired, this device could be
treated as 1600 separate time-interval-based QRNGs operating in
parallel and would allow the use of spatial information as well as
temporal to generate random bits, as shown in Figure 5.2.
Assuming a uniform beam profile and pixel efficiency (so that
every pixel has equal probability of detecting a photon), and N
pixels, each sample would provide log2(N) random bits. This
would be insignificant, however, next to the improvement from
1600 parallel QRNGs. However, one would need individual timing
circuitry for each pixel. Additionally, different pixels would
undoubtedly not have the same detection efficiency, potentially
introducing unwanted bias into the final data.
5.3 Time Resolution Measurement
We are currently operating at a time-bin resolution of 27 ps, as
afforded by our ACAM TDC-GPX Time-to-Digital Converter [17].
By relying on the known propagation times of inverters, this device
offers a very simple implementation at a very low cost ($300). We
recently evaluated a PicoQuant Picoharp 300 [29], which has a
time-bin resolution of 4 ps. This device, however, is very expensive
(approximately $20,000) and is infeasible for our current
implementation. Therefore, at this time we have no immediate
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Figure 5.2: Example multi-pixel photon-counting array. Assuming 8× 8 pixels,
and the capability to resolve which pixel received a photon (as denoted by the
circle), each detection event would provide up to 6 bits of random data. This
assumes equal pixel efficiency and a uniform-intensity beamprofile, making
this difficult to implement. Specifically, although one could measure the device
characteristics and the light beam transverse intensity profile, and thereby
quantify the randomness per detection (just as we did for our own time-based
system), for secure operation one would need to monitor these characteristics
every time the QRNG was used, in order to avoid undetected biases in the raw
(unhashed) data.
plans to upgrade our time-bin resolution.
5.4 Data Processing
The data processing component of our QRNG has room for several
improvements. The current FPGA (Xilinx Spartan-3) is an older
model, and simply upgrading to a new version such as the Virtex-6
[30] would allow for more processing power and faster operation.
Specifically, we plan to implement a system that will, in real-time,
monitor the incoming time-interval data and perform several
analysis operations.
Our current implementation expects a fixed amount of entropy
per detection. This parameter is set during the device initialization
and cannot be changed unless the QRNG is reset. Consequently, if
the detection rate were to change suddenly (as a result of a change
in the light flux or in the detector efficiency) and the entropy per
detection were to go down, the system would not detect this
condition and would then be assigning more bits per detection
than it should. By periodically sampling the time-interval data
and adjusting the number of random bits assigned to each
detection, the quality of our random numbers will be increased.
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Additionally, we would like the capability to perform, in realtime,
several statistical randomness tests on our data. This would
require substantial processing power and would certainly require
an upgraded FPGA.
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APPENDIX A
ATTENUATION
As discussed in Section 2.4, we have used a variety of techniques to
attenuate the light to the desired photon flux. We have also
assumed that, given a high enough level of attenuation, any
unwanted effects arising from a non-ideal light source will be
washed out of the final data. To verify this we have run a variety
of simulations, but for the purpose of this discussion we will
assume the most extreme case - one for which the light initially
contains zero randomness.
In previous sections, when referring to the waiting-time
distribution, we have defined the ideal case as one for which every
time-bin has equal probability of occurring. While important, this
definition does not encompass the entire problem. If, for example,
the final waiting-time distribution was flat, but the order in which
these events occurred was deterministic - while seemingly having a
maximum entropy value, the data would be totally non-random.
Therefore, we will now assume that the ideal case is one for which
every value in the waiting-time distribution is independent of every
other, or Poissonian.
A.1 Poissonian Light
A Poissonian process is a continuous-time counting process
characterized by a rate parameter λ. The rate parameter is the
expected number of events per unit time, or in our case, the average
number of single-photon detections per second. For simplicity, we
assume a homogeneous process, one for which λ does not change
over time. In this case, the number of events that have occurred
up to time t is N(t), and the number of events in the interval
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(t, t+ τ ) is characterized by P [N(t+ τ )−N(t) = k] = e−λt(λt)k
k!
.
Consequently, the waiting-time between arrivals is the same as the
time until the first (since they are all independent), and is
therefore given by P [N(t)−N(0) = 0] = e−λt(λt)0
0!
= e−λt. For this
distribution, the mean number of occurrences λ is also its variance,
and thus fluctuates with standard deviation σk =
√
λ. These
fluctuations are referred to as Poissonian noise, and are an
important measure of randomness in our waiting-time distribution.
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Figure A.1: Actual (blue) vs. theoretical (red) waiting-time distribution of
raw data given an average detection rate of 6 MHz and a time-bin resolution
of 5 ns. Deviation from the expected decaying exponential is due to
after-pulsing and timing effects within the system.
As shown in Figure A.1, the measured waiting-time distribution
does not exactly fit the expected e−λt behavior. Given an infinite
amount of time and samples, the two would approach each other.
In the event that the noise is less than expected, the distribution is
sub-Poissonian, and in the case that it is more, super-Poissonian.
A.2 Squeezed Light
It has been shown [15], that under certain conditions it is possible
to generate light for which the number uncertainty is less than for
a coherent state. Using an LED driven by current through a
resistor, at sufficiently low temperatures the resistor’s Johnson
noise dominates over the quantum shot noise, giving the photon
flux sub-Poissonian characteristics. Therefore, the resulting
waiting-time distribution contains less uncertainty, a feature
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undesirable for random number generation.
Fortunately, given any distribution, heavy enough attenuation
(or random deletion), will cause the resulting distribution to
approach a Poissonian [16]. To verify this we numerically modeled
a totally periodic source, as shown in Figure A.2a. As every
interval is the same, the waiting-time histogram contains only one
value, which for simplicity has been assigned the first time-bin.
Next, we simulate increasing the attenuation percentage. This was
done using a RNG which outputs a number between 0 and 1. If
the number was greater than the percent attenuation, that was
counted as a detection. Otherwise, the time interval was increased
and the RNG ran until the next detection.
As shown in Figure A.2, increasing levels of attenuation result in
waiting-time distributions that, at higher levels of attenuation,
approach the decaying exponential characteristic of a Poissonian.
At an attenuation level of 95%, the difference between the two
distributions decreased to less than one percent. Therefore, since
we operate at an optical attenuation level of 99.9999%, it is
reasonable to assume that any correlations are reduced to an
insignificant level and may be ignored.
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Figure A.2: Simulated waiting-time distributions of perfectly number-squeezed
light for attenuation levels of 0% (a), 20% (b), 50% (c), 75% (d), 90% (e), 95%
(f), 99% (g), and 99.9% (h).
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APPENDIX B
SHAPED-PULSE
CIRCUIT
As discussed in Section 3.3, in order to reduce the bias in our
waiting-time distribution we have simulated a circuit which drives
our laser diode in such a way as to make every time-bin occur with
approximately equal probability. Given a desired uniform
waiting-time distribution with reset period T, the output current
must be of the form 1
T−t
, which is impossible to achieve. Therefore,
we have approximated the pulse shape using the method detailed
below.
The circuit in our design contains three major components: a
sawtooth generator, logarithmic converter, and differentiator.
Additional implementation specific components are required to
achieve correct signal levels (gain stages, voltage followers, etc.),
but the four main components can accurately approximate the
pulse shape. The pulse is achieved by starting with a sawtooth
(T-t), taking its natural log (ln(T-t)), and differentiating to
achieve the final pulse shape of( 1
T−t
).
B.1 Sawtooth Generator
The sawtooth generator is the first stage of our shaped pulse
circuit. As shown in Figure B.1, the design for the sawtooth is
fairly simple. Other components for impedance matching and
voltage shifting will need to be added depending on the
implementation specifics, but are not shown here. The left side of
the circuit (the op-amp and resistors R3 and R4) form a bistable
multi-vibrator, or a square wave. The square wave signal is then
fed into the integrator formed by the right op-amp, forming a
symmetric triangle wave. The symmetry is lost, however, due to
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the values of the resistors R1 and R2. With a small R1, the
capacitor charges fast, and with a large R2, charges slowly, thus
forming the desired sawtooth shape, given by the equation
f = 1
2C(R1+R2)
R3
R4
.Due to the high bandwidth requirements of this
circuit, several high-speed components had to be used. Specifically,
OPA847 op-amps [31] and 1N4148 fast rectifying diodes [32], were
used to achieve a bandwidth of approximately 3.9 Ghz.
Figure B.1: Sawtooth generator circuit for our shaped-pulse implementation.
B.2 Logarithmic Converter
After the (T − t) sawtooth shape has been generated, the next step
in preparing the shaped pulse is to create the natural log of signal,
or ln(T − t). This is accomplished with a logarithmic converter
[33], a device based on the precisely logarithmic relationship
between collector current and emitter-base voltage in a bipolar
transistor. Specifically, given a collector current Ic and
emitter-base voltage Vbe, the two are related by the equation
Ic = Ise
Vbe
Vt , where Is and Vt are device specific saturation current
and thermal voltages. As shown in Figure B.2, transistor Q1 is
used as the non-linear feedback element around an op-amp.
Negative feedback is applied to the emitter of Q1 and the emitter
base junction of Q2. This forces the collector current of Q1 to be
exactly equal to the current through the input resistor. Negative
feedback forces the collector current of Q2 to equal the current
through R3. Since the collector current of Q2 remains constant,
the emitter-base voltage also remains constant. Therefore, only the
Vbe of Q1 varies with a change of input current. The resulting
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output voltage is given by Eout =
−kT
q
R1+R2
R2
ln EINR3
EREFRIN
.
Figure B.2: Transistor based logarithmic converter design, as shown in [33]
B.3 Differentiator
In order to achieve the final pulse shape, a differentiator is
required to convert the current from ln(T − t) to 1
T−t
. This is one
of the most elementary circuits built with op-amps, so greater
detail will not be given to this component. As shown in Figure
B.3, however, using the high-speed OP847 op-amp allows for a
reasonable approximation to the final pulse shape.
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Figure B.3: Ideal (blue) and simulated (red) shaped pulse of 1
T−t
pulse-shape
(a) as well as associated waiting-time distribution (b).
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